The “Climate” Dust Has Been Settled. What’s Next After Dubai?
In the heart of Dubai, against the backdrop of shimmering skyscrapers and the desert’s golden horizon, global leaders convened for Convention of Parties (COP) 28 as the most pivotal climate summit of our time.
As delegates from nations around the world gathered under the banner of hope and urgency, the eyes of billions were fixed on this historic moment, where the fate of our planet hung in the balance. Against a backdrop of mounting climate crises and growing public outcry, COP28 stood as a beacon of possibility and a chance for humanity to unite in the face of its greatest challenge yet.
Although nations universally acknowledge the staggering toll humanity will endure should we surpass the 1.5oC of critical temperature thresholds, previous climate summit (COP27) have been marred by an abundance of rhetoric and a dearth of tangible progress. Despite the resounding consensus on the urgency of the climate crisis, COP27 have too often fallen short in translating lofty promises into meaningful action, particularly in catalyzing vital climate investment in the Global South. This region, housing over 80% of the world’s population, bears the brunt of climate impacts, exposing the most vulnerable communities to unprecedented risks and injustices.
COP28’s deliberations revolve around three pivotal issues: the finalization of global stocktaking, the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, and the strengthening of Carbon Markets. At the core of the Paris Agreement’s framework lies the inaugural Global Stocktake (GST), a cornerstone of the five-year ambitious cycle aimed at evaluating national climate pledges, assessing progress, and refining Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs).
Designed to gauge collective advancements in mitigation, adaption, and support mechanisms like technology transfer & finance, the GST serves to bolster commitments on a global scale. However, tensions arise as developing countries, predominantly from the Global South, emphasize the need for accountability regarding past efforts and the failure of many developed nations in the Global North to align actions with equity principles. Conversely, industrialized countries contend that emerging economies will drive future emissions, advocating for a forward-looking approach in GST deliberations focused on emissions limitations.
At COP28, the focus on financing loss and damage presents a critical opportunity to establish a unified fund with clear objectives aimed at bolstering the resilience and adaptive capacity of vulnerable regions, particularly in the Global South. However, defining investment modalities proves challenging due to the diverse contexts of at-risk nations and the nuanced needs for adaptation and resilience.
The contentious issue of ‘who pays’ looms large, with fragile consensus achieved on contributions from developed and developing countries, and allocation to ‘particularly vulnerable’ nations. Yet, while setting a numerical target is a starting point, mobilizing these funds remains mired in unresolved debates.
The last focus at COP28 is on strengthening carbon trading, as outlined in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Aimed at leveraging private capital to reduce the costs of climate action. Negotiators from over 190 nations convened in Dubai to discuss credit standards allowing carbon polluters to offset emissions by investing in emission reduction projects elsewhere. This mechanism facilitates financial support from buyer countries to host countries, with the latter foregoing emission reductions in their NDCs, transferring this right to the buyer country for subtraction from its own commitments.
Despite the potential of carbon markets, significant uncertainties and challenges persist. Many supplier nations in the Global North lack established frameworks for carbon trading, necessitating time for development. This includes defining authorization processes and compliance with reporting standards. Meanwhile, host countries in the Global South must carefully balance investment opportunities with reaching their NDC commitments to avoid overselling mitigation outcomes.
To address this, they may implement whitelist for eligible project types, such as those aligned with conditional NDC targets. Nevertheless, the Global South sees COP28 as a beacon of hope for addressing unresolved issues from COP27. While diverse in nature, the Global South encompasses a spectrum of developing nations with varying climate risks and developmental statuses.
UAE Consensus
The outcome document at COP28, so-called UAE Consensus, stands as a pivotal moment in the global fight against climate change. Underscored by historic commitments and collaborative action. With a landmark pledge to triple installed renewable energy capacity worldwide to over 11,000 Gigawatts (GW) and double energy efficiency by 2030, as well as phase down coal power plants and decarbonize the transportation sector, the COP28 showcased unprecedented global ambitions to curb emissions and mitigate the escalating risks posed by climate change.
What does it mean for Indonesia’s climate journey moving forward? President Joko Widodo, in his keynote address at the COP28 World Climate Action Summit (WCAS), emphasized Indonesia’s need for USD 1 trillion to achieve Net Zero Emissions by 2060 that requires an annual average of USD 30–40 million. On the other side, Indonesia has pledged to reduce emissions by 31.89% independently or 43.2% with international aid by 2030, compared to 2010 levels. Alongside targets of 23% and 31% of renewable energy in the national energy mix by 2025 and 2050, respectively.
The challenge facing Indonesia is immense, requiring urgent action across financing, technology, and capacity building. As it outlined in the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to below 2oC, with a preferable target of 1.5oC by 2100. The COP28 witnessed USD 85 billion in investment commitments across various climate sectors, including energy and adaptation. Notably, USD 800 million was pledged to the loss and damage fund, yet this covers only a fraction (about 0.2%) of developing countries’ annual climate-related losses. Question remains about the fund’s mechanisms and Indonesia’s access to it.
Indonesia’s Renewable Energy Landmark after Dubai
According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), achieving UAE consensus on renewable energy would boost renewable generation to over 40,000 TWh, attracting USD 10.4 trillion in investment. With Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) like solar and wind comprising over 60% of new capacity, this milestone underscores renewables’ increasing cost competitiveness.
Given Indonesia’s favorable geography and untapped renewable potential, the nation should seize the opportunity to align with COP 28 commitments. With abundant solar, wind, geothermal, and hydropower resources, Indonesia stands to gain strategically by leveraging renewables to drive economic growth, provided policies to facilitate technological advancements to reach parity with fossil fuel power costs.
In November 2023, Indonesia’s potential for floating solar became tangible with the inauguration of the Cirata floating photovoltaic (FPV) power plant, boasting a capacity of 192 MWp. This marks Southeast Asia’s largest FPV and the world’s third largest. Analysis suggests Indonesia could accommodate up to 28.4 GW of floating solar across 783 suitable reservoirs and lakes, showcasing the nation’s capacity for innovative renewable energy solutions.
Furthermore, analysis also suggests Indonesia could achieve 75 GW of hydroelectric capacity through both dam construction and responsible development of free-flowing rivers, particularly near power load centers. Geothermal capacity is also estimated at 29 GW, offering opportunities for a cleaner energy transition. Additionally, offshore and onshore wind potentials in eastern provinces could be tapped, fostering domestic manufacturing clusters through public-private partnerships.
Indonesia’s current transmission infrastructure is inadequate to accommodate the expected surge in renewable energy integration while maintaining reliability. In the current Java-Bali system, power plants run conventionally, using geothermal and coal as base loads while gas and hydro to adjust to the variations in electricity demand during the day across seasons. The production of hydropower is reliant on water availability. During the dry season (April to October), when there is less water intake, hydro facilities typically produce less energy, while gas-fired plants ramp up to fulfill demand.
Reflecting these conditions, Indonesia’s power system requires significant enhancements to manage the intermittency of these renewable sources. Similar preparations are underway in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and other major interconnections. The long-term electricity procurement plan (RUPTL 2021–2030) outlines a focus on constructing 500 kV and 150 kV transmission systems over the next decade, with plans to add 32,237 km of lines and 55.8 GVA of transformer capacity by 2030.
At COP28, Indonesia’s PLN secured 14 clean energy agreements, including one for a transmission grid interconnection. Efforts are underway to develop HVDC subsea cable interconnectors between Java and neighboring islands, such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Nusa Tenggara, to enhance supply-demand balance and share reserve margins. Interconnection enables pooling of solar and wind resources to mitigate variability, while linking hydroelectric and coal-based networks improves grid flexibility. Additionally, decommissioned coal facilities in exhausted regions could be repurposed into utility-scale battery storage hubs through responsible mine reclamation efforts.
Future Climate Negotiation
Structural flaws within the UNFCCC have hindered its effectiveness in mandating climate mitigation actions, particularly at the nation-state level, where its primary focus lies. High turnover of state negotiators every four to five years poses challenges to long-term climate action, leading to inconsistent positions and unsustainable approaches. While non-state actors like the private sector, NGOs, and academia are beginning to engage in climate action, their involvement remains limited. Urgent efforts are needed to mobilize climate actions from non-state actors, including subnational governments, cities, corporations, and NGOs, which have significant potential to complement national efforts and bridge the gap between current commitments and necessary climate targets.
On the other side, the current climate financing system is inefficient, insufficient, and inequitable. With escalating debt levels and borrowing costs, climate action requires increased equity investments and concessional financing. Although industrialized nations pledged to support climate activities in developing countries with USD 100 billion annually, implementation has fallen short, leaving promises unfulfilled even 14 years after the commitment was made.
Reflecting COP28, there are three options on bridging the gap between global climate negotiations and climate action. First, advancing collective efforts and realizing actual climate actions. This entails translating long-term strategies into short-term commitments through NDCs, adopting regionalized strategies and technology-based approaches, enhancing global financial architecture for necessary mobilization, and implementing breakthrough models for climate finance.
Second, to improve the effectiveness of COPs, we should consider tweaking the current model by alternating between large and small COPs. Introducing ‘mini’ COPs with thematic or regional focuses in between could alleviate the burden on annual mega-conferences and promote more cohesive regional events. Third, to enhance COP effectiveness, we must recognize and integrate the pivotal role of non-state actors into formal negotiations. Despite significant contributions and agreements made during COPs, non-state actors’ involvement often lacks formal incorporation into follow-up negotiations, hindering progress.
Beyond COP28, Indonesia has the opportunity to lead by example, guiding other emerging economies toward renewable energy development in achieving net-zero emissions. After Dubai, we should size this development to redefine the future of COPs. By uniting both state and non-state actors, we can craft a novel framework that embodies ambition, resilience, and adaptability. It is incumbent upon us all to forge a future where global unity prevails in confronting the trials of climate change, nurturing a sustainable, equitable, and inclusive global society.
